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11. Introduction   
Patents provide very important incentives for innovative activity by enabling innovators to appropriate 
innovation rents through the granting of exclusive rights on their innovations. The limit of these exclusive 
rights is defined by two elements – patent length and patent breadth. Patent length is the time period 
during which the innovator has exclusive rights on the innovation and is predetermined by law. Patent 
breadth defines the technological territory claimed and protected by the patent – the area in the 
technological space within which competitors cannot offer rival innovations without infringing the patent 
– and is explicitly chosen by the innovator. 
A standard assumption in the economics literature is that an innovator tries to maximize the rents 
appropriated by his innovation by choosing to claim the maximum patent breadth, thereby deterring the 
entry of other firms and thus enabling the innovator to earn monopoly rents (Gilbert and Shapiro 1990). 
Such a strategy, however, fails to recognize that patents are often challenged legally in the Patent Office 
or in the courts (Cornish 1989, Merges and Nelson 1990). The nature of this challenge is such that the 
broader is the patent protection, the higher is the probability that the patent will be challenged legally by 
competitors, that it will overlap another patent and/or that the courts will invalidate it or narrow its scope 
(Lerner 1994). Given that patent breadth is routinely challenged, the question arises as to whether the 
innovator is able to choose a patent breadth that deters entry, or whether the innovator is forced to share 
the market with a new entrant. 
  The purpose of this paper is to examine the optimal patent breadth strategy that an innovator 
should employ when faced with the possibility that the patent breadth claimed will be challenged. In this 
paper, the optimal patent strategy is determined in a sequential game of complete information. The agents 
in the game are an innovator who seeks patent protection and decides on the patent breadth claimed and a 
potential entrant who decides on whether to enter the patentee’s market and, if entry occurs, where to 
locate in the vertically differentiated product space. The solution to this game is obtained by backward 
induction – the problem of the entrant is examined first, followed by the problem of the innovator.  
  The paper shows that that it is possible under some conditions for an innovator to use patent 
breadth to deter entry – when this is possible, the optimal patent strategy is to always deter entry. These 
conditions occur under certain combinations of the entrant’s R&D effectiveness and trial cost values (i.e., 
low R&D effectiveness – which results in high R&D costs – and high trial costs). When these specific 
conditions do not hold, the optimal strategy for the innovator is to allow a new competitor to enter the 
market. When allowing entry, the innovator chooses patent breadth so that the benefits of increased 
product differentiation that result from greater patent breadth are traded off with the increased likelihood 
of patent challenge that comes with greater patent breadth. One of the conclusions of the paper is that the 
innovator will only choose the maximum patent breadth when patent infringement is never an optimal 
strategy for the entrant. This occurs under a very specific set of conditions (i.e., a combination of very 
high R&D effectiveness and high trial costs values).  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the theoretical development 
of the strategic patent breadth model; it describes the market conditions, defines patent breadth and 
models the choice of patent breadth as a sequential game of complete information. Section three provides 
the analytical solution of the model. Section four concludes the paper. 
2.  Strategic Patent Breadth Model   
The patenting process is modeled as a sequential game of complete information. The agents involved in 
the game are an incumbent/patentee who applies for a patent and decides on the breadth of patent 
protection claimed, and a potential entrant who decides where to locate in the product space and who 
potentially competes with the incumbent in the market. It is assumed that the incumbent has invented a 
product that meets the patentability requirements and that the regulator (i.e. Patent Office) always grants 
the patent as claimed; thus the regulator is not explicitly modeled. The latter assumption is made to reflect 
the case under which the innovator has no help from the Patent Office in determining the breadth of 
 
2patent protection. The assumption that the Patent Office grants the patent as claimed is a realistic 
assumption for drastic innovations. 
The game consists of three stages. At the first stage of the game the incumbent, having invented a 
drastic product which will allow him to exert monopoly power in the market and having decided that he 
wants to patent it, determines the breadth (b) of protection that will be claimed. In the second stage an 
entrant observes the patentee’s product and the breadth of protection granted to it and chooses whether to 
enter the market or not. If the entrant does not enter, the patentee operates as a monopolist in the third 
stage of the game. If the entrant decides to enter she does so by choosing the characteristics of her product 
- i.e., her location in the product space. Once the entrant enters, two cases may prevail in the third stage of 
the game. If the entrant does not locate within the patentee’s claims or if she locates within the patentee’s 
claims and infringement is not found then both the patentee and the entrant market their products and 
compete in prices. However, if the entrant locates within the patentee’s claims and infringement is found 
then the entrant is not allowed to market her product and the patentee operates as a monopolist at the third 
stage of the game. It is assumed that both the patentee and the entrant are rational and foresighted. Thus, 
they both fully anticipate the reaction of their opponent to each of their actions. 
In this model, the patentee determines the breadth of protection that will allow the maximum 
appropriation of innovation rents. The patentee acts strategically taking into consideration the entrant’s 
responses to his choice of patent breadth. He is aware that the probability of the patent being attacked 
and/or invalidated increases with the breadth of protection and that a broad patent could impede his ability 
to enforce his rights if the patent is infringed and/or if its validity is directly challenged. In addition, the 
innovator does not rely on the Patent Office to structure his claims. He is aware of the inefficiencies in the 
determination of patent breadth in the Patent Office and of the fact that his effort to safeguard his 
technological territory does not usually conclude with the granting of the patent.  
The incumbent’s decisions to invent (i.e. his choice of the innovation’s specifications) and to 
patent are not examined – these decisions are treated as exogenous to this game. The only decision that 
the incumbent has to make involves the breadth of protection that will be claimed – the length of 
protection is predetermined and is the same for all patents. In addition, it is assumed that the patentee and 
the entrant produce only one product each and that the entrant does not patent her product since further 
entry is not anticipated. It is also assumed that the production process is deterministic; once the entrant 
chooses a location she can produce the chosen product with certainty. Finally, it is assumed that there is 
no time lag between making and realizing a decision. 
2.1  Market conditions and determination of patent breadth 
The market in which the patentee and the entrant operate is characterized by the following conditions. 
The market can only support two products. Every product   (i=1, 2) has an inherent quality represented 
by the parameter  . The quality parameter   takes values in the interval [
i
i q i q q q, ] where q  corresponds to 
the lowest quality that can be allowed in the market while q corresponds to the highest quality that is 
technologically feasible. All consumers agree that higher quality is preferred to lower quality. It is also 
assumed that every product can be completely described by its quality alone (i.e., only one variety of the 
product can be produced). 
 The market consists of differentiated consumers uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1], each 
buying one unit of either product 1 or 2 but not both. The consumers differ with respect to some attribute 
λ uniformly distributed with unity density  1 ) ( = λ f  in the interval λ∈[0, 1]. The attribute λ determines a 
consumer’s willingness to pay for quality. Consumers differ in their willingness to pay due to differences 
in income, age, education and/or other characteristics. The utility function for the consumption of product 
 is given by:   i
i i i p q V U − + = λ     ( i=1,2)       (1) 
where   is the product price and V is a base level of utility. Product   will be consumed as long as  i p i
 
3i U ≥0 and U >U i j. It is assumed that V is large enough for V≥ ∀i=1,2 to hold true so that the market is 






  It is assumed that the patentee’s product is product 1 of quality q1 and the entrant’s product is 
product 2 of quality q2. It is also assumed that the entrant enters with a better quality product, such that 
q2=q1+ε where ε∈(0, (q -q1)]. The parameter ε represents the difference between the entrant’s and the 
patentee’s quality or equivalently the distance away from the patentee’s product that the entrant locates in 
the quality space. The consumer who is indifferent between products 1 and 2 has a λ value denoted by   


















= ⇒        ( 2 )  
The marginal consumer   determines the market shares of products q λ ˆ
1 and q2 as depicted in Figure 1.  
U1, U2 
 
Figure 1.   Market Shares of Product 1 of Quality q1 and Product 2 of Quality q2 
 Consumers  with  a  λ value such that λ∈[0,  ] buy the patentee’s product (the lower quality 
product) while consumers with a λ value such that λ∈( , 1] buy the entrant’s product (the higher quality 
product). Given that every consumer buys only one unit of the product of his choice, the demand the 
patentee and the entrant face for their products are given by   and  , respectively. 
λ ˆ
λ ˆ
y λ ˆ 1 2 − = y
  The same production cost structure is assumed for both the patentee and the entrant. The per unit 
production costs are assumed to be independent of the level of quality and are equal to zero. The 
production of product 2 of a given quality   requires the incurring of fixed sunk costs (R&D costs), 
however. These fixed costs, denoted by  , are an increasing function of quality: 
2 q
) q ( FR 2
2 q
FR β =  where 
9
4
. The parameter β represents the effectiveness of the R&D process. Low β values represent high 
R&D effectiveness and imply low R&D costs while high β values represent low R&D effectiveness and 
imply high R&D costs.  
  An important assumption in the model is that reverse engineering is possible and costless, which, 
1  0  λ ˆ
q1 




4in the absence of protection, enables the entrant to reproduce the patented product without incurring the 
R&D costs. Costless reverse engineering implies that  0 ) ( 1 = q FR  for the entrant. Since q2=q1+ε the R&D 
costs incurred by the entrant for the production of q2 are a function of ε, namely:
2
2 ε
β = R F . Given the 
above, it is increasingly costly for the entrant to locate away from the patentee (i.e., to produce the better 
quality product) in the quality product space. As will be shown below, the more costly it is for the entrant 
to produce product 2, the smaller is the degree of differentiation between her product and the patentee’s 
product.  
   The patentee and the entrant compete in the one-dimensional product space presented in Figure 2 
where quality is depicted on the vertical axes. In this product space point A represents product 1 of 
quality q1. We denote the breadth of protection claimed and granted to product 1 when it is patented by 
the variable b. The breadth of patent protection b takes values in the interval b∈[0,  1 q q− ]. To normalize 
the model, we assume that  1 1 = − = q q d  which implies that b∈[0, 1] and ε∈(0, 1]. When b takes its 
minimum value of zero the protected area is just a point in the product space, point A. This case 
represents the minimum breadth of protection granted by the patent, namely zero breadth. With zero 
breadth of protection, the entrant can locate anywhere in the product space except at point A. Thus, zero 
breadth protects the patented product only against duplication.  
q
 
Figure 2.  The Product Space and the Breadth of Patent Protection  
  After observing the quality of the patentee’s product (q1) and the breadth of the patent (b) 
protection granted to it, the entrant chooses whether or not to enter in the patentee’s market. If the entrant 
decides to enter she has two choices: to locate inside (ε < b – point I in Figure 2) or outside (ε ≥ b – point 
N in Figure 2) the patentee’s claims. The first choice corresponds to a decision to infringe the patent, 
while the second corresponds to a decision not to infringe the patent. It is assumed that when the entrant 
locates at a distance ε<b away from q1, a trial always takes place, either because the patentee files an 
infringement lawsuit or because the entrant directly challenges the validity of the patent. It is further 












5infringer that the patent is invalid.
1 The costs incurred during the infringement trial/validity attack by the 
patentee and the entrant are denoted by C  and C  respectively. These costs are assumed to be 
independent of the breadth of protection and of the entrant’s location. The trial costs will only be incurred 






If the entrant locates within the patentee’s claims the patent may not always be found to be valid. 
Indeed, the greater is the breadth of the patent, the smaller is the probability that the patent will be found 
to be valid or equivalently that infringement will be found. This assumption follows in part because the 
broader is the protection claimed, the harder it is to avoid obviousness, to differentiate the innovation 
from prior art (to show novelty) and to demonstrate that the innovation is enabling. As well, this 
assumption is in accordance with evidence from the literature that courts tend to uphold narrow patents 
and invalidate broad ones (Waterson 1990, Cornish 1989, Merges and Nelson 1990). It is also assumed 
that when the maximum breadth is claimed (b=1), the patent will always be found to be invalid. These 
assumptions are captured by assuming that the probability that infringement is found, µ, is equal to 
b − =1 µ . 
The patent system being modeled is assumed to be that of the fencepost type, in which claims 
define an exact border of protection. Under the fencepost system, infringement will always be found 
when an entrant locates within the patentee’s claims, unless the entrant proves that the patent is invalid 
(Cornish 1989).
3 In the fencepost system the probability that infringement is found does not depend on 
how close the entrant has located to the patentee. The implication of assuming a fencepost patent system 
is that the probability that infringement will be found (given that the entrant has located at  b < ε  distance 
away from q1) is equal to the probability that the validity of the patent will be upheld. Thus, the fencepost 
patent system implies that the events that the patent is found to be infringed and that the patent is found to 
be invalid can be treated as mutually exclusive and exhaustive.  
A summary of the formal three stage strategic patent breadth determination game is presented 
diagrammatically in Figure 3. In Stage one, the patentee chooses patent breadth b. In Stage two, the 
entrant determines whether to enter in the patentee’s market. If the entrant decides not to enter, the 
patentee makes monopoly profits (Π ) in Stage three of the game and the entrant makes zero profits (see 
payoffs at A). If the entrant decides to enter she chooses where to locate in the quality space by choosing 
the distance ε away from q
m
b
1. The choice of ε determines whether a trial occurs. The no trial outcome 
occurs if the entrant chooses  ≥ ε . In this case, at Stage three of the game, the two competitors both 
produce their respective products and compete in the market by choosing prices. The payoffs for the 
patentee and the entrant are   and  , respectively (see payoffs at B). The trial outcome occurs if 





b < ε . At trial, there is a probability µ that infringement is found and a probability 
µ − 1  that infringement is not found. If infringement is found during trial, the entrant is not allowed to 
market her product in Stage three of the game. In this case, at Stage three, the patentee operates as a 
monopolist while the entrant makes zero profits. If infringement is not found during the trial, then the 
patentee and the entrant compete by choosing prices. The entrant has no incentive to relocate within the 
quality space (i.e., the entrant has no incentive to move from point I in Figure 2) as she has already 
incurred the R&D costs which cannot be recovered. The payoffs for the patentee and the entrant when the 
entrant chooses  b < ε  are   and   respectively (see payoffs at C).    ) (
I
P Π E ( E
                                                 
1 This is a standard defence adopted by accused infringers (Cornish 1989). 
2 With this assumption we exclude the possibility of the court awarding lawyers’ fees to either party.  
3 In contrast, a signpost patent system implies that claims provide an indication of protection and the claims are 
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Figure 3.   Graphical Representation of the Strategic Patent Breadth Game  
 
73.  The Analytical Solution of the Strategic Patent Breadth Game 
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the sequential strategic patenting game is found using 
backwards induction. The prices that the patentee and the entrant charge for their products when they both 
operate in the market are determined first. The entrant’s quality choice (her location on the quality 
product space) is derived next and the optimal breadth of patent protection for the patentee is determined 
last. The use of backwards induction eliminates multiple equilibria that do not represent credible threats 
and yields the only sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. 
The game is first solved under the assumption of no patent protection to determine where it is 
optimal for the entrant to locate when her choice is not constrained by the breadth of patent protection. 
This represents the entrant’s most preferred location choice which is used as a benchmark for comparison 
with choices that are available to the entrant when her location choices are constrained by the breadth of 
patent protection.  
3.1  No Patent Protection  
  The Entrant’s most preferred location choice  
The entrant’s most preferred location is found using backwards induction. Since it is assumed that there is 
no patent protection there are only two stages in this game. The equilibrium prices of the incumbent’s and 
the entrant’s products are determined first. The equilibrium prices determine the Bertrand profits for the 
two players. The entrant’s quality choice, her location on the quality product space is determined last.  
The pricing equilibrium. In this stage of the game the quality choice has been made and fixed costs have 
been sunk. As shown in sub-section 2.1 the demand for the incumbent’s and the entrant’s product is given 
by   and  , respectively. The incumbent and the entrant choose the prices for their 
products that maximize their profits, given respectively by: 
λ ˆ
1 = y λ ˆ 1 2 − = y
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Simultaneously solving the equations in (4) yields the equilibrium prices, the quantities supplied and the 
profits in the final stage of the game, given by: 





= p , 
3
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B    (5) 





= p , 
3
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  Since the entrant has the higher quality product, she charges the higher price. The entrant serves 
two thirds of the market, while the incumbent serves one third of the market. Profits are increasing in the 
distance ε between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s location. The greater is the difference in quality 
between the two products, the less intense is competition at the final stage of the game and the greater are 
 
8the profits for both the incumbent and the entrant.
4  
The location choice. The entrant chooses the distance ε away from q1 that will maximize her profits at this 
stage of the game. The objective function of the entrant is given by: 











ε − = − = Π R
B F max                ( 6 )  











2 = ⇒ = − ⇒ =
∂
Π ∂
                ( 7 )  
The second order conditions (S.O.C.) for a maximum are satisfied since: 
   0 0
0 2









                ( 8 )  
The most preferred location choice for the entrant is given by  0 ε  in equation (7) which holds for 
9
4
≥ β  





1 0 1 + = + = q q 2 q . 
  The profits for the incumbent and the entrant under the no protection outcome are obtained by 
substituting equation (7) into their respective profit functions. This substitution yields the following 
payoffs: 







1 = = Π  
           (9) 












0 0 = − =
0
2 Π  
Proposition 1. Under no patent protection the less costly it is to produce the better quality product (i.e., 
the smaller is β), the further away from the incumbent the entrant locates and the greater are profits for 








































≥ β .    
  When the R&D costs are minimized − this happens when β takes its minimum value  )
9
4
( = β  − 
the entrant locates at the edge of the market (ε=1) maximizing differentiation between her product and the 
incumbent’s product. The smaller are the R&D costs the greater is the distance ε away from the 
                                                 
4 This is a well-established result in the product differentiation literature in simultaneous games. When competitors 
first simultaneously choose their locations in the product space and then compete in prices they choose maximum 
differentiation to relax competition in the pricing stage that would curtail their profits (Lane 1980, Motta 1993, 
Shaked and Sutton 1982). 
 
9incumbent that the entrant locates and the greater are the profits for both the incumbent and the entrant. 
Thus, maximum possible product differentiation is desirable by both players. 
3.2  Patent Protection b∈[0,1] 
When the incumbent’s product is protected by a patent, the entrant’s location choices are constrained. 
Given the assumption of complete information, the patentee knows the entrant’s cost structure, her trial 
costs and can anticipate the entrant’s reaction to his choice of patent breadth. Since the entrant’s location 
choice determines the level of the patentee’s profits, the patentee chooses the breadth of protection that 
induces the desired behavior from the entrant.  
  The patentee knows that there is only one case in which the breadth of the patent does not 
influence the entrant’s location decision. This happens when the entrant’s cost structure is such that it is 
optimal for her to locate at the edge of the market (when 
9
4
= β  then  1 0 = ε ). In this case, irrespective of 
the breadth of the patent (ε is greater or equal to b for all b∈[0, 1]), the patent is never infringed and 
profits are maximized for both players. The patentee is free to choose any patent breadth, even the 
maximum breadth of protection, without triggering the trial outcome and having his patent invalidated.  
  For any value of 
9
4
> β , the breadth of the patent may affect the entrant’s location decision, 
which in turn affects the patentee’s profits. If the patentee chooses  0 0 ε ≤ < b  it is always optimal for the 





0 =  and no trial will occur. This 
outcome yields the same payoffs as the no protection outcome analyzed above.
5 However, if the patentee 
chooses  1 0 ≤ < b ε  the entrant must first decide, depending on the value of patent breadth, whether to 
enter or not in the patentee’s market. If she finds it profitable to enter, she must further decide whether to 
infringe or not the patentee’s product.  
  A key element in the patentee’s decision making is whether there is a value of patent breadth, 
∈(ε b ˆ
(Π
0, 1], that can deter market entry. If b  exists, the patentee can choose this patent breadth and make 
monopoly profits. This outcome is illustrated in the payoffs at A in Stage Three in Figure 3. It is assumed 
that the entrant decides not to enter when she is indifferent between entering and not entering the market. 
Thus,   is defined as the patent breadth that makes the expected profits that the entrant realizes when she 
infringes the patent (  and the profits that she realizes when she does not infringe the patent 









  If there is no value of patent breadth that can deter entry in the patentee’s market the patentee 
must find whether there is a value of patent breadth, denoted by b
~
∈(ε0, 1], that makes the entrant 
indifferent between infringing and not infringing the patent. The variable b
~
 thus makes the entrant’s 
payoffs at B equal to the payoffs at C in Figure 3. Formally, if b
~
 exists it should make   given in 
equation (10) equal to zero. 
E Z




E E E Π − Π = Ζ ) (
 If  b  exists the patentee always chooses to deter entry. If   does not exist and b ˆ b ˆ ~
 exists, the 
patentee makes a decision of patent breadth by comparing his expected profits when the patent is 
                                                 
5 The entrant always finds it optimal to enter since in this case her profits (given by equation (9)) are always 
positive.  
 
10infringed   and his profits when the patent is not infringed  . The difference in the 























            ( 1 1 )  
NI
P Π − Ζ )
 If  0 > Z  the patentee chooses a patent breadth that induces the entrant to infringe; a patent 
breadth that makes . If   the patentee chooses a patent breadth that results in non-
infringement; a patent breadth that makes 
0 > E Z 0 ≤ P Z
0 ≤ E Z . It is assumed that the entrant chooses not to infringe 
when she is indifferent between infringing and not infringing the patent.  
  Since the patentee’s profits depend on the entrant’s location on the quality product space, the 
patentee must first solve the entrant’s location problem to be able to determine the breadth of protection 
claimed that maximizes his profits. In other words, the patentee must first determine the values of b  and  ˆ
b
~
, if they exist. Note that both   and b b ˆ ~
 are such that,  , b ˆ b
~
∈(ε0, 1].  As it has been discussed in section 
3.2 above, the entrant may find it optimal not to enter or to enter and infringe the patent if and only if 
0 ≤ < b ε ; when  0 ε ≤ b  it is always optimal for the entrant to enter and to locate at her most preferred 
location ε , infringement does not occur and a trial does not take place.  To determine the values   and  b ˆ
b
~
 the patentee needs to determine the entrant’s expected profits when she infringes the patent and her 
profits when she does not infringe the patent when  1 0 ≤ < b ε . The case where the entrant finds it 
optimal to infringe the patent is considered first. 
3.2.1   The Entrant’s location decision when  1 0 ≤ < b ε  
  The Entrant’s expected profits when she infringes the patent (ε < b) 
When the entrant infringes the patent the trial outcome is triggered. During trial it is determined whether 
infringement has occurred (or equivalently whether the patent is valid) or whether infringement has not 
occurred (or equivalently whether the patent is invalid).  
The pricing equilibrium. If infringement is found during the trial, the entrant is not allowed to market her 
product and makes zero profits in the final stage of the game, while the patentee makes monopoly profits: 
  P:      m Π =             (12) 
  E:       0 =
If infringement is not found, the entrant is allowed to remain in the market and to produce the quality of 
product that she has chosen. In this case, both the entrant and the patentee market their products and 
compete in prices in the third stage of the game. Their Bertrand profits are determined through the process 
described in the pricing equilibrium in sub-section 3.1 and are given by: 
   P:    
             (13) 
 E:    2
B π =   
T
where  T ε  is the entrant’s optimal location choice under the trial outcome. 
The location choice. The location of the entrant is determined through the optimization of her expected 
profits given by: 
E:  E E R
B I I
E C b C F − − ⋅ + = − − ⋅ − + ⋅ = Π Ε
2 9
4






π µ π µ
ε
         (14) 
Recall that the probability of the patent being found valid is  b − =1 µ . Optimization of the objective 
function in equation (12) yields the F.O.C. for a maximum: 
 














= ⇒ = − ⇒ =
∂
Π ∂
        ( 1 5 )  















         ( 1 6 )  
  Equation (15) shows that when the entrant infringes the patent she finds it optimal to locate at a 
distance proportional to the breadth of the patent. Because there is uncertainty with respect to whether the 
entrant will be able to continue in the market, she ‘underlocates’. In order to reduce the R&D costs, which 
are incurred with certainty, the entrant locates closer to the patentee than she would have done had 
infringement not been a possibility. Note that when the patentee chooses the maximum patent breadth 
(b=1) the entrant finds it optimal to locate at her most preferred location, 
0 ε ε = T . This occurs because 
the entrant knows that she will win at trial with certainty since when b=1 the patent is never found to be 
valid (i.e., µ=1-b=0). 
   The entrant’s expected profits when she infringes the patent are obtained by substituting the 
entrant’s optimal location under trial from equation (15) into her expected profit function. The 
substitution yields the following payoffs: 
 E:  E
I






Ε        ( 1 7 )  
  Equation (17) shows that the greater is the breadth of the patent, the greater are the expected 
profits for the entrant under the trial outcome. This result occurs because the greater is the breadth of the 
patent, the greater is the probability that infringement will not be found (or equivalently that the patent 
will be invalidated) and thus, the greater is the probability that the entrant will be able to operate in the 
market. In addition, the greater are the trial costs that the entrant must incur the smaller are her expected 
profits when she infringes the patent. Figure 4 depicts the relationship between expected profits under 
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Figure 4.  The entrant’s Expected Profits Under Infringement 
 
12  Equation (17) gives one set of conditions under which the entrant can be deterred from entering 
the market. The entrant will enter into the patentee’s market and infringe the patent if and only if 
. Thus, the patentee can prevent entry (and subsequently patent infringement) by choosing a 
patent breadth that makes  , i.e., by choosing a patent breadth that satisfies: 
0 ) ( > Π Ε
I
E
0 ) ( ≤ Π Ε
I
E







b ≤           ( 1 8 )  
Thus,   denotes the breadth of patent protection that makes the entrant indifferent between entering the 
market and infringing the patent on the one hand and not entering on the other hand. Whether b  
exists depends on the values of β and C
I b ˆ
] 1 , ( ˆ
0 ε ∈ I
E.  
  Equation (18) shows that the greater are the costs of producing the better quality product (i.e., the 
greater is β) and the entrant’s trial costs, the greater is the breadth of the patent that would prevent entry 
under infringement. These insights are depicted in Figure 4 and the intuition behind it them as follows. 
The greater are the costs of producing the entrant’s product, the closer to the patentee the entrant is forced 
to locate and the smaller are the profits for the entrant. Similarly, the greater are the trial costs, the less 
profitable infringement becomes. Under these conditions, infringement is profitable only if patent breadth 
is relatively large. The greater is patent breadth the larger is the probability that the patent will be 
invalidated during trial and the greater is the probability that the entrant will be able to operate in the 
market.  
  The Entrant’s profits when she does not infringe the patent (ε ≥b) 
The pricing equilibrium. When the entrant does not infringe the patent both the patentee and the entrant 
market their products and compete in prices in the final stage of the game. Their profits are determined 
through the process described in the pricing equilibrium in sub-section 3.1 and are given by: 




π =  
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π =   
where  n ε  is the optimal location choice when the entrant does not infringe the patent. 
The location choice. The entrant’s optimal location choice under no infringement is determined through 
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  s.t.    b ≥ ε             
The Lagrangean of the entrant’s profit maximization problem is: 
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Since ε≠0 ⇒ 0
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. This solution is rejected since under this 
case 0 ε ε > > b .  
Case 2. If λ>0 then  b n = ε  and 
9
4








. The profits for the entrant under this case are 
given by substituting the solution ε  into the entrant’s profit function. This substitution yields the 









− = Π           ( 2 1 )  
  Equation (21) shows that the greater are the costs of producing the higher quality product (the 
greater is β) the smaller are the profits for the entrant when she decides not to infringe the patent and 
locates outside the patentee’s claims. Figure 5 depicts the entrant’s profits when she does not infringe the 
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Figure 5.  The Entrant’s Profits Under No Infringement  
  Figure 5 shows that the entrant’s profits under no infringement are constant for breadth values 
less than or equal to the entrant’s most preferred location (b≤ε0) and they are declining for breadth values 
greater than the entrant’s most preferred location (ε0<b≤1). When patent breadth is less than or equal to 
the entrant’s most preferred location, the entrant always finds it optimal to locate at her most preferred 
location (ε0) and makes maximum profits ( ). However, when patent breadth is greater than the 




  The entrant will choose to enter and not infringe the patent if and only if Π . The patent 
breadth that makes entry under no infringement non profitable for the entrant ( ) must satisfy the 
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Thus,   denotes the breadth of patent protection that makes the entrant indifferent between entering the 
market  without infringing the patent on the one hand and not entering on the other hand. Since 
 equation (22) implies that   exists only for β values such that 
n b ˆ
, ( 0 ε ] 1 ˆ ∈ n b n b ˆ
9
8
≥ β . 
  Equation (22) shows that the greater are the R&D costs (the greater is β) that need to be incurred 
for the production of the entrant’s product, the smaller is the patent breadth that prevents entry under no 
infringement. This result is depicted in Figure 5 and the intuition behind it is as follows. The entrant must 
locate outside the patentee’s patent breadth for infringement not to occur. If patent breadth is large it may 
not be profitable for the entrant to locate outside the patentee’s claims because it becomes more expensive 
to produce her product. The greater are the costs of producing the better quality product, the closer to the 
patentee the entrant is forced to locate and thus the smaller is the patent breadth that makes it unprofitable 
for the entrant to enter without infringing the patent. 
  Equations (18) and (22) give the conditions for non-entry under infringement and under no 
infringement, respectively. The breadth of patent protection that deters entry in the patentee’s market, b , 
if it exists, must simultaneously satisfy both conditions for non-entry under infringement and under no 
infringement. Thus, the entry deterrence condition is given by equation (23): 
ˆ







b ≤ ≤           ( 2 3 )  
Equation (23) shows that patent breadth   deters entry if and only if both the entrant’s expected profits 
under infringement and her profits under no infringement are less or equal to zero; for b    
∧ Π . 
b ˆ






  Another important element in the patentee’s decision making, besides the existence of the patent 
breadth   that can deter entry, is whether there is a patent breadth  b ˆ ] 1 , (
~
0 ε ∈ b  that makes the entrant 
indifferent between infringing and not infringing the patent. If entry cannot be deterred (i.e., a b  does not 
exist), before the entrant enters she must decide whether to infringe or not infringe the patent. As 




, if it exists, makes the difference between the entrant’s 
expected profits when she infringes the patent and her profits when she does not infringe the patent 
(denote by  ) equal to zero.   E Z
  The determination of the entrant’s expected profits under infringement and her profits under no 
infringement allow the patentee to determine the value of  E Z . Substitution of the expressions for the 
expected profits under infringement and the profits under no infringement given by equations (17) and 
(21), respectively, into the expression for  ,  given by equation (10), yields:  E Z









            ( 2 4 )  
  Equation (24) shows that   is a function of the breadth of the patent (b), the entrant’s cost 
structure (β) and the entrant’s trial costs (C
E Z
E). The entrant’s cost structure and the trial costs are 
exogenous to the game; these parameters are not affected by the decisions made by the patentee or the 
entrant. Patent breadth, however, is determined by the patentee. Thus, the breadth of patent protection 
claimed can determine whether the entrant will find it profitable to infringe or not infringe the patent. 
Proposition 2. When the entrant finds it optimal to enter the market (i.e., when entry cannot be deterred) 
 
15then: 
(a) The greater is the breadth of patent protection the greater is the entrant’s incentive to infringe the 
patent. 
(b) The more costly it is to produce the better quality product the greater is the entrant’s incentive to 
infringe the patent. 



















≥ β  ∧  ] 1 , ( 0 ε ∈ b  
The greater is the breadth of patent protection the more costly it becomes for the entrant to locate outside 
the patentee’s claims. In addition, the greater is the breadth of patent protection the greater is the 
probability that the patent will be invalidated and that the entrant will win at trial. Both the above 
outcomes increase the entrant’s incentive to infringe the patent.  















≥ β  ∧  ] 1 , ( 0 ε ∈ b  
The greater are the costs that need to be incurred for the production of the better quality product the less 
profitable it becomes for the entrant to locate outside the patentee’s claims. 







.      
  The existence of a patent breadth that deters entry, b , is closely linked to the existence of a 




Figures 6 and 7 depict different scenarios with respect to the existence of   and b b ˆ ~
. Figure 6 depicts two 
cases under which entry cannot be deterred - a  ∈(ε b ˆ
0, 1] does not exist. Figure 7 depicts three cases 
under which entry can be deterred - a  ∈(ε b ˆ
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Figure 6.   The entrant’s profits under infringement and no infringement when entry cannot be 
deterred − a b ∈(ε ˆ
0, 1] does not exist 
  Panel (a) in Figure 6 represents the case where there is no patent breadth that can deter entry in 
the patentee’s market and a b
~
∈(ε0, 1] does not exist. In this case non infringement is always an optimal 
strategy for the entrant as the curve depicting the entrant’s profits under no infringement is above the 
curve depicting the entrant’s expected profits under infringement for all patent breadth values (see 
Proposition 3 for a formal proof). Panel (b) in Figure 6 represents the case where there is a b
~
∈(ε0, 1], but 
b
~
 does not satisfy the entry deterrence condition, thus implying that entry cannot be deterred (see 
Proposition 6 for a formal proof). This result occurs because patent breadth b
~
 results in positive profits 
for the entrant irrespective of whether she infringes the patent or not. Neither b  nor   can deter entry 
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Figure 7.   The entrant’s profits under infringement and no infringement when entry can be deterred 
– a  ∈(ε b ˆ
0, 1] exists 
  Panel (a) in Figure 7 represents the case where entry can be deterred and there is no  ] 1 , (
~
0 ε ∈ b . 
Patent breadth b  deters market entry since it satisfies the entry deterrence condition. In fact, any value of 
patent breadth such that b  can deter entry. Panel (b) in Figure 7 represents the case under which 
n ˆ
] 1 , ˆ [ n b ∈
b
~
 is the only patent breadth that can deter entry. Finally, panel (c) in Figure 7 represents the case where 
there is a b
~
∈(ε0, 1] and b
~
 satisfies the entry deterrence condition. In this case, there is a range of patent 
 
18breadth values that can deter entry in the patentee’s market. That is, eitherb
~
, ,b  or any b  
can deter entry since all the above patent breadth values satisfy the entry deterrence condition.  
I b ˆ











  As it was mentioned above, patent breadth b
~
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 is solved for b. This solution yields the 
following two roots:  2
8 +
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≥ β  ∧ C E≥0 and it is thus rejected 
since 1
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0 ≤ < b ε . The root 
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β β β β E E C C
b  ∀ 
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4
≥  ∧ CE≥0 and it 
is accepted as a possible solution. Thus, if b
~
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= b . 
~
  The patent breadth b  that makes the entrant indifferent between infringing and not infringing the 
patent is a function of the entrant’s cost structure (β) and her trial costs (CE). Patent breadth b  exists only 
if the values of β and CE are such that  1
~
0 ≤ < b ε . It is easily verified that the condition 
~
b  is 













β β β β
ε
E E C C
b  ∀ 
9
4
≥ β  ∧ CE≥0. The condition   
is satisfied for certain combinations of β and CE values. To determine the combinations of β and CE 
values which satisfy the condition  1
~
≤ b , the pairs of β and CE values which satisfy the above constraint 
as an equality ( 1
~
= b ) are determined first. The solution of  1
~
= − b  with respect to CE yields: 
β




= E C . The combination of β and CE values for which 
~
b   is represented by the 
locus  1
~
= b  in Figure 8. The area to the right of the locus  1
~
= b  represents all combinations of β and CE 
for which b
~




b ); this area includes the dotted and vertically hatched areas in Figure 8. This 
case is also depicted in panel (b) in Figure 6 and in panel (b) and (c) in Figure 7. The area to the left of the 
locus 
~
= b  represents all combinations of β and CE values for which b
~
 does not exist (
~
> b ); this area 
includes the non-shaded and the horizontally hatched areas in Figure 8. This case is also depicted in panel 
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Figure 8.  Combinations of CE and β values for which  ] 1 , ( ˆ ,
~
0 ε ∈ b b  exist 
 If  1
~
0 < b ε  exists, it can deter entry if and only if it also satisfies the entry deterrence condition  ≤
8






b ≤ . The entry deterrence condition is satisfied for 
9
8
≥ β  and for certain 
combinations of β and CE values. To find the combinations of β and CE values that satisfy the entry 
deterrence condition, the locus that satisfies the condition as an equality is determined first. The locus 
b b ˆ ~







b = =  holds true. 




= E C . This case is also depicted in 
panel (b) in Figure 7. All combinations of β and CE values above the locus  b b ˆ ~
=  and below the locus 
1
~
= b  − the dotted area in Figure 8 − satisfy the entry deterrence condition. This case is also depicted in 
panel (c) in Figure 7. The combinations of β and CE values below the locus b b ˆ ~
=   and below the locus 
1
~
= b  − the vertically hatched area in Figure 8 − do not satisfy the entry deterrence condition. This case 
is also depicted in panel (b) in Figure 6. 
  The close relationship between the existence of a patent breadth   that can deter entry 
and a patent breadth 
] 1 , ( ˆ
0 ε ∈ b
] 1 , (
~
0 ε ∈ b  that makes the entrant indifferent between infringing and not infringing 
the patent is further demonstrated in the propositions that follow. 
Proposition 3. If  ] 1 , (
~
0 ε ∈ b  does not exist it is never optimal for the entrant to infringe the patent. 
 
20Proof: 
At the entrant’s most preferred location  0 ε  non infringement is always more profitable than infringement 
for the entrant. That is, for 
β 9
4





3 < − + − =
β β
E E C Z  ∀ 
9
4
≥ β  ∧ C E≥0. The 
above conditions imply that if a  ] ( 1 ,
~
0 ε ∈ b  does not exist (i.e., there is no patent breadth that makes 
ZE=0), then ZE<0 ∀b∈[0,1] which implies that Π > . This result is depicted in panel (a) in 





Proposition 4. If  ] 1 , (
~
0 ε ∈ b  does not exist, the only patent breadth   that can deter entry is the 
patent breadth that satisfies the non-entry condition under no infringement. 
] 1 , ( ˆ
0 ε ∈ b
Proof: 
From Proposition 3 it is known that for b=ε0 ZE<0. If b
~
 that makes ZE=0 does not exist then ∀b∈[0,1] 
ZE<0⇒ > . If there is a patent breadth b  that satisfies the non-entry condition under no 
infringement this implies that for b   . Given that Π > , when   the entry 
deterrence condition is also satisfied. In this case, any   can deter entry. This case is depicted in 
panel (a) in Figure 7.   
NI
E Π ) (
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Proposition 5. If  ] 1 , (
~
0 ε ∈ b  exists: 
(a)  The greater are the costs of producing the higher quality product, the smaller is the breadth of 
the patent that makes the entrant indifferent between infringing and not infringing the patent.  
(b)  The greater are the trial costs, the greater is the breadth of the patent that makes the entrant 
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β   
The more costly it is to produce the better quality product, the closer the entrant is forced to locate to the 
patentee and the smaller is the breadth of patent protection that makes it unprofitable for the entrant to 
locate above the patentee’s patent breadth. 
(b)  0














≥ β  ∧ CE≥0 
The greater are the trial costs the less appealing is infringement to the entrant. The entrant in this case will 
infringe only if the breadth is so large that her cost structure does not allow her to locate outside the 
patentee’s claims.   
Proposition 6. If  ] 1 , (
~
0 ε ∈ b  exists and b
~
 cannot deter entry (i.e., b
~
 does not satisfy the entry deterrence 





 exists, then for b b
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=  ZE=0. Since b
~
 cannot deter entry it follows from equation (10) that at b b
~
=  
both  ∧  must be satisfied. Assume that there is a b 0 ) ( > Π
I
E E 0 > Π
NI
E b
~ ˆ >  that can deter entry in the 
market. Then at   both  ∧  should be satisfied. But  b ˆ b = 0 ) ( < Π
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that at b b
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= ( E   , implies that ∀b 0 ) >
I
E Π b
~ ˆ > E   . Thus, there is no patent breadth  0 ) ( > Π
I
E b b
~ ˆ >  
that can deter entry. Now assume that there is a  b b
~ ˆ <  that can deter entry in the market. Then at b  
both  ∧Π  must be satisfied. But   is concave in b, 
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given that at b b
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=   , implies that ∀b 0 > Π
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~ ˆ <  that can deter entry in the market. This case is presented in Figure 6, panel (b).   
Proposition 7. If  ] 1 , (
~
0 ε ∈ b  exists and it satisfies the entry deterrence condition as an equality then b
~
 is 
the only breadth of patent protection that can deter entry. 
Proof: 
The proof in this proposition is similar to the proof in Proposition 6. Since b
~
 is the breadth of patent 
protection that makes ZE=0, if b
~
 makes   it should also make   (this follows from 
equation (10)). Since 
0 ) ( = Π
I
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~ ˆ < ) (Π
I
E E    and ∀  0 < b b
~ ˆ >   . Also, since   
is concave in b, ∀ 
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~ ˆ >   . Thus, there is no b 0 < Π
NI
E b
~ ˆ ≠  for which 
  ∧    which implies that there is no b 0 ) ( < Π
I
E E 0 < Π
NI
E b
~ ˆ ≠  that satisfies the entry deterrence 
condition. This case is depicted in panel (b) in Figure 7.   
Proposition 8. If  ] 1 , (
~
0 ε ∈ b  exists and it satisfies the entry deterrence condition as a strict inequality 
then there is a range of patent breadth values in the interval [  or in the interval [  that can 
deter entry. 
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] 1 , ˆ [ n b
b  such that  . 
This case is represented graphically in Figure 7, panel (c). If   exists then any   can 
deter entry. If   does not exist then any b  can deter entry in the market.   
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) ˆ ( = I b b






] 1 , 0 ε ( ˆ ∈ I b ∈
3.2.2   The Patentee’s Strategic Patent Breadth Decision  
In sub-section 3.2.1 it was shown that the existence of a patent breadth b  that deters market entry and/or 
a patent breadth b
ˆ
~
 that makes the entrant indifferent between infringing and not infringing the patent 
depends on the entrant’s R&D effectiveness (β) (i.e., her R&D cost structure) and her trial costs (CE). The 
 
22existence of   and  b ˆ b
~
  determines the patentee’s optimal patent breadth choice and the profits that can be 
realized. Different outcomes with respect to the patentee’s patent breadth choice and profits emerge under 
different scenarios regarding the existence of b  and  ˆ b
~
. These scenarios and the respective outcomes that 
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Figure 9.   The Patentee’s Strategic Patent Breadth Decision  
 
 
24  Scenario One: There is a patent breadth b  or a range of patent breadth values in the 
interval [  or in the interval [  that deter entry. 
ˆ
] , I n b b ˆ ˆ ˆ ] 1 , n b
b
~
Under this scenario, irrespective of whether   exists or not, it is always optimal for the patentee to claim 
the breadth of patent protection b   or any breadth values in the interval [  or in [ that deter 
entry. By claiming b  the patentee makes monopoly profits 
ˆ ] ˆ , ˆ
I n b b ] 1 , ˆ
n b
ˆ
m Π .  





 that makes the entrant indifferent between infringing and not infringing the 
patent. 
Under this scenario, as described in Proposition 3, the patent is never infringed. The patentee’s profits 






π = = Π , where  b n = ε  (see sub-section 3.2.1). The patentee chooses 





b = maxΠ           ( 2 5 )  
  s.t.     1 0 ≤ ≤ b
Equation (25) shows that the patentee’s profits under no infringement are increasing linearly in patent 
breadth. Given that patent breadth takes values in the interval 0 1 ≤ ≤ b   the patentee’s profits under no 
infringement are maximized for b=1. The patentee’s profits when the patent is never infringed are 










1  b 
Figure 10.   The Patentee’s Expected Profits When the Patent is Never Infringed 
   In Figure 10 the patentee’s profits are increasing linearly in patent breadth and are maximized for 
b=1. The above results show that when it is never optimal for the entrant to infringe the patent (i.e., when 
there is no b  or  ˆ b
~
) it is always optimal for the patentee to claim the maximum breadth of patent 
protection, b .     1 max =
  The results in scenario two capture the standard assumption made in the patent breadth literature 
with respect to the patentee’s patent breadth decision. The assumption in the patent literature is that the 
patentee claims the maximum breadth of patent protection (Merges and Nelson 1990, Gilbert and Shapiro 
 
251990, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001). The above result suggests claiming the maximum patent breadth 
protection is an optimal strategy for the patentee only if non infringement is an optimal strategy for the 
entrant. 
  Scenario Three: There is a patent breadth b
~
 that makes the entrant indifferent between 
infringing and not infringing the patent and b
~
 cannot deter entry. 
Under this scenario, as it has been shown in Proposition 6, if b
~
 cannot deter entry then there is no other 
breadth of patent protection   that can deter entry. In this case, the patentee has to determine 
whether it is more profitable to induce infringement by claiming a patent breadth b
] 1 , ( ˆ
0 ε ∈ b
b
~
>  or not to induce 
infringement by claiming a patent breadth b b
~
≤ . The patentee under this scenario uses the value of 




P P E Z Π − Π = ) ( 0 > P Z b b
~
>  
that induces the entrant to infringe the patent. If  0 ≤ P Z  the patentee chooses a b b
~
≤  that induces non 
infringement. The optimal patent breadth value is determined through the solution of the patentee’s 
maximization of expected profits under infringement and under no infringement.  
  The Patentee’s expected profits when he induces infringement (b b
~
> ) 
When the patentee claims  b b
~
>  he knows that the entrant’s optimal strategy is to infringe the patent. 
The patentee makes monopoly profits with probability  b − =1 µ  if his patent is found valid during trial 
(or equivalently if infringement is found) and duopoly profits with probability  b = − µ 1  if his patent is 









=  is the entrant’s optimal location when she infringes the patent (see sub-
section 3.2.1). The patentee also incurs trial costs denoted by C  which are independent of the breadth of 
patent protection claimed. 
P
  The patentee chooses the breadth of patent protection that maximizes his expected profits under 
infringement. The patentee’s objective function is given by: 





b C − − + Π = Π 1 ) 1 ( ) ( π µ µ
~
         s.t.       1 ≤ ≤ + b e b  where     0 → e
The Lagrangean of the patentee’s profit maximization problem is given by: 
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26Case 1. If  0 2 1 = = λ λ ⇒ 1
~






















 which implies that   is a minimum not a 
maximum and   is thus rejected as a solution. The above conditions indicate that there is a corner 






 is the breadth of 
patent protection that maximizes the patentee’s expected profits under infringement.  
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Case 3.  If  0 2 < λ  then b e b + =
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Comparison of the patentee’s expected profits when b=1 given by equation (27) to the patentee’s 
expected profits when b e b + =
~
 given by equation (28) yields the following results. For monopoly profit 
values  ,  . For monopoly profit values  089 . 0 ≥ Πm e b b b
I
P E
+ = = Π ≤ ~ 1 ) (
I
P E Π ) ( 089 . 0 < Π , 
. Note that, under scenario three, all values of the entrant’s R&D effectiveness 
(β) and trial costs (C
m
e b b + =
~ b
I
P E = Π > 1 ) (
I
P E Π ) (










≤ E C  are satisfied (i.e., 
β and CE values in the vertically hatched area in Figure 8). 
  The above results show that the smaller are the monopoly profits that the patentee makes when 
his patent is found valid at trial, the greater is the patentee’s incentive to claim the maximum breadth of 
protection and have his patent revoked. This happens because under infringement the entrant’s location is 




= ) so the greater is patent breadth the further 
away from the patentee the entrant locates and the greater are the profits at the last stage of the game for 
both players. In other words, in this case, the effect of the loss of monopoly profits due to the large patent 
breadth is smaller than the effect of the increased profits brought by the increased level of differentiation 
between the two products. However, when monopoly profits are large the patentee does not want to risk 
having his patent revoked by claiming the maximum breadth of patent protection and he claims 
e b b + =
~
 instead. In this case, the effect of the decrease in expected profits due to the decrease in 
product differentiation is smaller than the effect of the increase in expected profits due to the increased 
probability that infringement will be found at trial and the patentee will realize monopoly profits. 
 
27  Given that the level of monopoly profits is unknown, two cases have to be considered. Under the 
first case  , while under the second case  . The two 
graphs in Figure 11 depict the above two cases when 
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Figure 11.   The Patentee’s Expected Profits When Infringement Is Induced 
  As shown in Figure 11 when the patentee’s expected profits under infringement are represented 
by the curve AB the patentee maximizes his profits by choosing the patent breadth b e b + =
~
. When the 
curve CB reflects the patentee’s expected profits under infringement then the patentee maximizes his 
profits by choosing the maximum breadth of patent protection  1 = b . 
  The Patentee’s profits when he induces non infringement ( b b
~
≤ ) 
When the patentee claims  b b
~
≤  he knows that the entrant’s optimal strategy is to not infringe the patent. 
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Since the patentee’s profits under no infringement are increasing linearly in patent breadth the breadth of 
patent protection that maximizes equation (29) is b b n
~
= . Substituting b b n
~
=  in equation (29) yields 
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  Having determined the optimal patent breadth and the level of profits under infringement and 
under no infringement the patentee can determine the value of ZP. Two cases must be considered 
depending on whether b  or b 1 = e b + =
~
 is the optimal patent breadth under infringement.  
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Proposition 9. When  ] 1 , (
~
0 ε ∈ b  exists and it cannot deter entry, claiming the maximum breadth of patent 
protection ( ) is never an optimal strategy for the patentee unless  1 = b 1
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 The  value  of 
2 Z  cannot be determined without knowledge of the values of the 
parametersΠ ,
P
m β ,   and C . When  P C E ] 1 , (
~
0 ε ∈ b  exists and it cannot deter entry the optimal breadth of 
patent protection is either (b b
~
= ) or ( e + b b =
~
) depending on the relative values of the 
parametersΠ , m β , C  and  .   P E C




 that makes the entrant indifferent between infringing and not infringing the patent then: 
m (a) The greater are the patentee’s monopoly profits (Π ) the greater is the patentee’s incentive to 
induce infringement. 
(b)  The greater are the patentee’s trial costs (CP) the smaller is the patentee’s incentive to induce 
infringement. 
(c)  The greater are the entrant’s costs of producing the better quality product the greater is the 
patentee’s incentive to induce infringement given that the patentee’s monopoly profits are 
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Since under this scenario the patentee cannot deter entry, the only case that he can make monopoly profits 
is if his patent is infringed and he wins at trial. Thus, the greater are the monopoly profits that he 
anticipates to make the greater is his incentive to claim a patent breadth that will induce infringement.  
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The intuition behind this result is as follows. The greater are the entrant’s R&D costs, the closer the 
entrant is forced to locate to the patentee. In this case, the patentee has a greater incentive to induce 
infringement because the closer to the patentee the entrant is forced to locate, the smaller need be the 
patent breadth that will induce the entrant to infringe and thus, the smaller is the probability that the 
patent will be invalidated at trial. 
The effect that CE has on the patentee’s incentive to infringe the patent is inconclusive, it depends on the 
values of β and Π .    m
  Figure 12 depicts the patentee’s expected profits under infringement and his profits under no 



















Figure 12.    The Patentee’s Expected Profits Under Infringement and his Profits Under No 
Infringement Under Scenario Three 
  In Figure 12 line KΛ represents the profits that the patentee makes when his patent is not 
infringed. The curves AB and A′B refer to the expected profits that the patentee makes when his patent is 
infringed and  . The curve CB refers to the expected profits that the patentee 
makes when his patent is infringed and  . When the patentee’s expected profits 
under infringement are depicted by the curve A′B or the curve CB, the profits for the patentee are 
maximized at point Λ where the breadth of patent protection is b
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. When the patentee’s expected profits 
under infringement are depicted by the curve AB profits for the patentee are maximized at point A where 
the breadth of patent protection is b e +
~
.  
  To summarize the findings of sub-section 3.2.2, the patentee’s choice of the optimal patent 
breadth depends on the entrant’s R&D cost structure (β) and her trial costs (CE). When the combination of 
β and CE values is such that both conditions 
9
8




≥ E C  are satisfied (β and CE values 
are in the dotted and horizontally hatched areas in Figure 8), then there exists at least one patent breadth 
 that can deter entry in the market. In this case, the patentee always chooses patent breadth   and 
maximizes his profits (Π ) operating as a monopolist.  
b ˆ b ˆ
m











> E C  are satisfied (β and CE values are in the non-shaded area in Figure 8), then there 
is no patent breadth that can deter entry or that can make the entrant indifferent between infringing and 
not infringing the patent. The patentee thus finds it optimal to claim the maximum patent breadth 
(bmax=1), since in this case the patent is never infringed and a trial never occurs.  










< E C  are satisfied (β and CE values are in the vertically hatched 
 
31area in Figure 8), then it is optimal for the patentee to choose either patent breadth b
~
 and not induce 
infringement or b e +
~
 and induce infringement. The choice of the optimal patent breadth in this case 
depends on the patentee’s trial costs (CP), the monopoly profits that the patentee will make if his patent is 
found valid at trial ( ) and the entrant’s R&D cost structure (β) and trial costs (C m Π E).   
4.  Concluding Remarks 
Economic studies on patents have limited the study of the patenting behavior of the innovator to the 
analysis of his decision to patent or not to patent the innovation. The innovator’s decision to determine 
the breadth of protection that he will claim, which in turn determines whether the patent will be granted, 
the breadth of protection granted and the viability of the patent have not been explicitly modeled in the 
literature. Instead, various studies have assumed that a profit-maximizing innovator will always apply for 
the broadest protection possible. 
In this paper a simple game theoretic model is used to describe the patenting behavior of an 
innovator who, having invented a drastic product innovation and having decided to seek patent protection, 
determines the breadth of protection that maximizes the appropriation of the innovation rents from his 
innovation. To determine the optimal breadth of patent protection claimed, the patentee acts strategically, 
choosing the breadth of protection that induces the desired behavior by the entrant. The patentee is 
foresighted and anticipates that he may have to incur costs to enforce his patent rights. The model 
suggests that the strategic patent breadth, that is, the breadth of patent protection that maximizes the 
innovators ability to appropriate innovation rents, depends on the entrant’s R&D cost structure and her 
trial costs.  
Contrary to what it is traditionally assumed, the results show that it is not always optimal for the 
patentee to claim the maximum patent breadth possible. In fact, only for certain values of the entrant’s 
R&D effectiveness and trial costs it is optimal for the patentee to claim the maximum breadth of patent 
protection. The patentee claims maximum patent protection when he cannot deter entry and when the 
entrant always finds it optimal to not infringe the patent. The maximum breadth of protection is also 
claimed when the only patent breadth that deters entry  b b
~ ˆ =  is equal to one which occurs for a specific 
combination of R&D and trial costs (i.e., for 
9
8
= β  and 
9
1
= E C ). 
The results hold under the assumption of a fencepost patent system, which implies that the events 
that the patent is infringed and the patent is invalid can be treated as mutually exclusive and exhaustive. 
In addition, it has been assumed that the market can only support two products, and that the R&D process 
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